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Abstract
Democracy in the 21st century is exhibiting some radical dis-
continuities in terms of its forms and institutions and needs to
be rethought, if we wish to have a sustainable future. Democ-
racy increasingly will be shaped by three realities: the demise
of the nation state; the failure of representational liberal democ-
racy; and the radical impacts of resource insufficiency and
climate change. Yet if no government, however tyrannical,
survives for long except by consent of the people, then that
consent can serve as the starting point for rethinking what is
meant by “democracy.” Three terms are offered as functional
categories that allow for an assessment of democratic forms
and institutions: subsistence, operational and systemic. Each
describes how and why the population acquiesces to gover-
nance and under what conditions.
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INTRODUCTION
G iven the aftermath of Arab Spring in Egypt, the eventual eviction of the Oc-cupy Movement, and dismal recent voter turnout in Western countries
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(especially Canada and the United States), the reader would understandably expect
the title of this essay to foreshadow some discussion of the demise of democracy.
All these indicators, combined with various forms of extremism, could easily be
read as signs that 21st century democracy will be either be frail or short-lived.
Such is not the case, nor is this the conclusion to be drawn from current
circumstances and events. The “end” to which the title refers instead is the pur-
pose, or telos, of democracy in our time. Whatever continuities there might be
to that purpose in previous generations, however, democracy in the 21st century
is increasingly exhibiting some radical discontinuities in terms of its forms and
institutions. The times, like the climate, are a-changing; we cannot assume that
what has “worked” before will continue to “work,” or that the language we use
will continue to mean the same things it has meant before—or that it will be used
toward the same end.
Leaving the deconstruction of the problems to others, I want instead to suggest
what will come to characterize differing aspects of 21st century democracy. Retro-
spective analysis will not help; we need to look beyond current circumstances in
a trajectory toward the future instead of seeing ourselves primarily as inheritors of
past choices and situations. The Occupy Movement lacked such a focus forward,
leaving its members eventually to be evicted as a public nuisance or a community
health hazard, regardless of the force of their logic or the validity of their protests.
Without this focus forward, nothing changes for the better. When Martin Luther
King chose to make his famous speech from the Lincoln Memorial characterizing
the civil rights movement, he proclaimed, “I have a dream” instead of making the
more obvious and defensible statement that, “We are living in a nightmare.”
But to focus forward, we also need the appropriate language—without new
words (or old words used in new ways), we are unable to think new thoughts. If,
out of the shambles of the Thirty Years War and on the heels of the Treaty of
Westphalia, Enlightenment thinkers were able to reformulate their thoughts and
thus to create the society we have experienced for more than 350 years, we can
do the same today.
The end or purpose of democracy in the 21st century will be shaped by certain
realities that need to be incorporated into that focus forward. These need to be
seen as realities to be managed, however, not as paralyzing catastrophes or insur-
mountable barriers.
There are three such realities to incorporate: the demise of the nation state;
the failure of representational liberal democracy; and the radical impacts of re-
source insufficiency and climate change.
The cumulative effect of these three realities is, of course, the end of the status
quo as we know it (or imagine it) to be. This is why there are discontinuities in
the forms and institutions of democracy—and why the philosophy of democracy
as it emerged from the Enlightenment needs to be rethought for the 21st century,
if we wish to have a sustainable future.
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THE DEMISE OF THE NATION STATE
Much ink has been spilled on the nature, origins and characteristics of the nation
state that the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) either incorporated or implied. The key
elements, however, were the integrity of borders and domestic autonomy—both
political and economic—with the resulting security for the population that would
allow them to go about their daily lives without interference from the outside.
Borders were protected in part by the alliances that autonomous nation states
formed, ensuring that inter-state conflicts had a balance in terms of the respective
powers involved that would give pause to the casual depredations that continen-
tal affairs had long included. The state, however it was governed, had an identity
that was both distinct and related to lines drawn on a map, regardless of the local
implications for ethnicity or ecological topography.
The nation state had a much more clearly defined role in European contexts
than it had in colonial ones, where local autonomy was casually superseded by
imperial activities. However arbitrary the lines drawn on European maps might
be, they were even more arbitrary when it came to dividing up the rest of the
world into colonial territories of European powers. Economic activity was di-
rectly linked to the integrity of imperial as well as national borders, moreover, in
that access to waterways and crucial natural resources became an object of strat-
egy and competition. So, too, did access to colonial markets for the disposal of
manufactured goods by the European imperial powers.
Any sense of real security derived from this system of checks and balances
was erased by two world wars. Four empires were shattered and two more re-
duced to rubble in the Great War of 1914-18, leaving other empires to rise in
ways that made the Second World War both inevitable and more catastrophic.
If the technology of modern (and then nuclear) warfare made physical bound-
aries irrelevant to the integrity of the nation state, the development of a truly
global economy made economic boundaries even more permeable. The end of
the Cold War, combined with the entry of China into the global economy—and
the parallel growth of global multi-national corporations—has rendered im-
possible any true economic autonomy for the individual nation state, however
large or powerful it might otherwise appear to be. The capacity to destroy the
planet might seem to be a desirable tool for wielding global power, but it has
proven of little real value in determining the course of everyday economic or
political activities.
Thus, it is fair to argue that the nation state, as conceived in the post-West-
phalian period, has outlived its usefulness as a means of organizing political,
economic or even military activity. It still serves a ceremonial function, a way of
organizing international sporting competitions like the Olympics, or embodying
regional history and heritage, but little more. Its power over its citizens is thus
effectively illusory, continued only by the acquiescence of those citizens to the
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forms and institutions of governance that they have accepted or to which they have
accommodated. These forms and institutions, however, are inadequate to the needs
of democracy in the 21st century and are thus on the cusp of significant change.
THE FAILURE OF LIBERAL REPRESENTATIONAL DEMOCRACY
The weakening of centralized, coercive control by the nation state is in fact an-
other indicator pointing to its imminent demise. Consider the following premise:
No government, however tyrannical, survives for long except by consent of the
people. Whether it is demonstrated by the end of empires, totalitarian regimes,
or military dictatorships—especially as the 21st century unfolds—coercive mea-
sures to retain control of government are doomed to eventual failure. As even the
poorest countries in the South become cross-wired with cellphones, it has cor-
respondingly become much more difficult to repress dissenting elements of the
population (whether they are defined by geography, ethnicity or political allegi-
ance). The propaganda behind such coercive efforts is now easily undermined by
the general sharing of information on the internet that once could be controlled
by the state.
While the most immediate examples to test the validity of such a premise
come from countries, past and present, whose governments are anything but de-
mocratic, the same conclusion can also be reached for liberal democracies. It is
the persistence of the forms and institutions of representational democracy that
reflects the will of the people, not the individuals, political parties or particular
governments that have assumed or been selected for leadership. It is the general
acquiescence of the population that allows for the continuation of these forms,
not legal, judicial or military coercion. (Considering the numbers of troops re-
quired by COIN theorists, there are not enough serving members of the Canadian
Forces (in all branches of combat arms) to suppress an insurgency in my home
city of Winnipeg, should it choose to rebel against the federal government.) It
is troubling to realize, therefore, that in different circumstances, that such acqui-
escence could be withdrawn. If it is, then no amount of external influence, of
whatever kind, would be enough to put Humpty back together again. The rapid,
tragic—and permanent—disintegration of the former Yugoslavia should be ev-
idence enough of the validity of this observation. In the year marking the 25th
anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, moreover, the collapse of state capi-
talism in countries of the former Eastern bloc and the dismantling of the Soviet
Union provide further evidence. So, too, the reunification of Germany against all
obstacles demonstrates what happens when the actions of a government receive
the active support of the people, not merely their acquiescence.
We need to recognize the fact that in Western democracies, where there are
varying forms of representative government, it is not the success of such forms
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and institutions that has enabled their continuation, but the tolerance of the peo-
ple. If, instead, it is the general acquiescence of the population—regardless of the
efficacy of their governments—that has enabled representational democracy to
continue, we need to examine “the will of the people” if we want to assess the
health of those forms and institutions. We also need to consider under what con-
ditions that acquiescence might be withdrawn.
Note here, as well, that it is the acquiescence of the population that needs to be
considered, not its active support. One need only measure the continuing decline
in voter turnout for elections at all levels of government to realize that claiming
the general population actively supports either the process or its outcome is a du-
bious conclusion. At best, they tolerate both, reluctant to opt for an alternative
that could be even worse.
The argument here, however, is about the failure of representational democ-
racy, not merely its inadequacies. Harking back to the aftermath of Westphalia,
there are two general classes of countries to consider—colonial powers and
their former colonies. The Enlightenment ideals of liberal democracy formu-
lated by the representatives from those colonial powers are no longer considered
universal truths about some natural condition of either individuals or their col-
lectives. The cultural contexts in which these ideals were articulated have long
since disappeared, supplanted by a global consumer culture these forebears
would neither recognize nor approve. What is more, the forms and institutions
of representational liberal democracy have had only marginal success in their
transplantation to former colonies. Watching the rise and fall of democratic gov-
ernance in too many countries in the global South confirms the idea that the
Enlightenment version of liberal democracy is little more than a convenient ve-
neer, disguising much less liberal activity by those who hold political power for
the moment.
In western democracies, studies have repeatedly shown decline in voter
turnout is matched by a generational disillusionment with the political process.
Younger people are disproportionately inclined not to engage in politics at any
level. Yet representational government only works if the general population feels
those who are elected actually represent them in the levels of government to
which they are elected. If representatives govern by their own lights, or in re-
sponse to the influence of lobbies of one kind or another, then the form of
democracy is played out, but not its content. If those elected are only infrequently
accountable to the electorate, then the rest of the time they are seen to govern
with essential impunity—and often do. If the occasional electoral accountability
is undermined by fraud or distrust, or if the candidates effectively all represent
a continuation of the same special interests and thus give the electorate no real
choice or alternative, then the outcomes have the form of democracy but, again,
none of its intended content. Add to this mix the evidence of corruption among
elected officials, and the meme of “the crooked politician” damns all those who
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hold public office—discouraging for the honest candidates who might run, and
disheartening for the elected representatives who work for the greater good and
not their own.
However inarticulate its proposals for change might have been, this kind of
critique of the current political situation was repeated over and over again by par-
ticipants—of all ages and stages—in the Occupy Movement. “We are the 99%”
is in itself a devastating commentary on the failure of liberal democracy in the
West, however carefully maintained the institutional façade might be. The peo-
ple might have been evicted as public nuisances and community health hazards,
but the sentiment underpinning the Occupy Movement continues to grow and the
problems it identified to date remain unresolved.
In other countries, such as those that experienced the Arab Spring movements
in its various forms, there is thus a double problem. Not only do the people,
especially the young people, desire “democracy”—which perhaps could mean
replacing their current method of governance—but the alternatives offered by
Western democracies are seen not only to be colonial institutions, but ones that
are failures in precisely the areas most important to these popular movements.
Democracy understood as an expression of the will of the people, who actively
participate in the decisions that lead to the future they want, does not easily fit
into structures that are seen to work poorly, if at all, even in countries with a long
history of democratic traditions. Add to this the necessity that effective democ-
ratic forms and institutions must be seen as indigenous expressions of the will of
the people, and it is no surprise that former colonies can neither simply accept
nor impose something from outside offered, however graciously, by their former
colonial masters. The passion is there for a change toward whatever the people
believe to be democracy, but the language and the institutions remain inadequate
to the task. The pot continues to simmer and occasionally boils over, but there is
no obvious resolution to these problems in places that tend to be referred to as
“young” or “emerging” democracies.
Thus, it is fair to conclude that liberal, representational democracy that has
evolved along the historical trajectory from the Treaty of Westphalia, through
the Enlightenment to today, has failed—or at the very least cannot be adapted
to the conditions and circumstances of the 21st century. There is a fundamental
discontinuity between its forms and institutions, grounded in the Westphalian na-
tion state, and those required for a sustainable future in a globalized society. Its
persistence is not evidence of the active support of populations in “democratic”
countries, moreover, but instead reflects the deterioration of such active support
into the mere acquiescence, for the moment, of the majority.
This (often grudging) acquiescence, even in established democracies, is in-
creasingly being challenged by the third reality: the radical impacts of resource
insufficiency and climate change.
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RESOURCE INSUFFICIENCY AND CLIMATE CHANGE
While arguments may be made at local levels about the success of liberal demo-
cratic processes, the utterly inadequate response of democratic governments to
issues related to climate change represents failure of the highest order at national
and international levels. We have not begun to process the implications of re-
source insufficiency, especially within the dynamics of a climate-changing world,
and this has frightening implications—especially for populations who only ac-
quiesce to the leadership offered by those individuals and governments who hold
the reins of authority. If it is true that a rising tide lifts all boats, a tsunami will
certainly swamp them—and we are living into a time when at least metaphorical
tsunamis will likely become commonplace.
“Resource insufficiency” may seem a banal way to characterize the effects of
crises to come, but when that resource is clean water to drink, or enough good
water for crops to grow or for livestock to survive, it becomes critical. When the
coastal waters are too polluted or too warm for the fish to survive close to shore
where the fishers can catch the food they need, or when there is a lack of fuel for
cooking or for transportation, there can be devastating consequences for health
and well-being. Even when it is something as simple as a shortage of long grasses
needed to thatch the roofs of huts in Maasai-land, there can be serious conse-
quences for the stability of local communities When such problems appear at a
rate faster than that to which local systems can adapt, these local systems are sim-
ply overwhelmed.
In small island states, the rising tides pose a serious threat as well as the
hurricanes and typhoons that will become more frequent as extreme weather pat-
terns related to climate change occur. Polar icecaps melting at a more rapid rate
than models predicted will mean substantial increases in sea levels that simply
submerge major population centers, as well. In other places, long-term drought
linked with soil degradation from intensive (irrigated) agriculture and aquifer de-
pletion, will turn current breadbaskets into dustbowls in places like the United
States and China. With an ever-growing global population, this spells disaster, as
food resources will be increasingly inadequate to feed the world.
Much more could be said (and has been said elsewhere). The point here is that
governments, supposedly representative of the people, which fail to provide the
necessities of life in local communities—whether as a result of some natural dis-
aster or because of the long-term decline of resources—risk losing any remaining
or potential support from the people who elect them. Moreover, any local social
stability that is reliant on external supports also may become a casualty of cli-
mate change. Consider the highly criticized response, both local and federal, to
the effects of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans—and contemplate what would
happen if the coastal United States were hit by a series of hurricanes in one year,
or spread over several years in succession. If Katrina is a measure of the meager
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resilience of one of the world’s wealthiest countries to natural disaster, just imag-
ine the effects of worse storms in countries in the global south where significant
areas and large numbers of people live at or below sea level.
There is a certain resignation, even stoicism, in communities devastated by
natural disasters over which they have no control—and over which the gov-
ernment has no control, either. But as the predicted consequences of climate
change are played out around the world—consequences that at least arguably
might have been avoided had governments properly exercised their mandate “to
serve and protect”—such resignation will be paired with growing anger. Es-
pecially when emergency response and longer term reconstruction services are
overwhelmed—as could easily happen—the failure of governments-at-a-distance
to predict the problems or provide for their solution will further increase such lo-
cal anger. Local authorities that try to do what they can in the face of disaster
will likely fair much better, however, both because of visible and immediate ef-
forts to help and because they will be considered less culpable in terms of the
larger issues around resource insufficiency and climate change than higher levels
of government.
Moving beyond the disasters unfolding as a resulting of changing climate,
there are those that are directly the consequence of human activities. The West-
phalian system of nation states emerged from a long period of intractable and
never-ending warfare. To a war-weary Europe, the appeal of territorial integrity
and domestic autonomy superseded any reservations about revenge against their
enemies. In a post-Westphalian system of international relations, however, nei-
ther territorial boundaries nor domestic autonomy will hold much weight if
critical resources—such as water—are under threat. Whether the lines on the map
are ever redrawn or not, it is possible both to undermine hostile governments
through subversive activities and to leverage, by economic means, control over
their resources and domestic policies that in previous times would have required
an absolute victory over them in war.
Yet the interconnectedness entailed by a globalized society is paradoxically
both the source of its resilience and strength, and the reason for its terrifying vul-
nerability. The more developed a region becomes, the less able are local areas to
manage all the dimensions of what is required for a sustainable society. The in-
terdependence of critical infrastructure and basic necessities with regions perhaps
a significant distance away means that local failures (crops, water, employment)
are mitigated by imports from away. On the other hand, it also means that events
far away can have devastating consequences on communities that are unable to
survive on their own without such imports.
This all conspires to mean that local politics, local concerns, local problems, have
the potential to cause global effects—and therefore to engage the interests of players
on a global stage who otherwise would never have noticed or cared what was going
on. The resulting system complexity, much of it managed by global multinational cor-
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porations rather than by nation states, makes conflict potentially into an instrument of
corporate activity than a continuation of diplomacy by other means.
Historians have noted the longevity of corporations that survive the defeat
in war of their host countries, just as they profit by their victories, because such
corporate entities have none of the political or geographic constraints of nation
states. In a globalized economy, this is unlikely to change, as mega-corporations
have economic assets and activities that easily exceed those of many nation states
and therefore act with impunity and according to their own interests.
Thus, if the 19th century was marked by the proxy conflicts of colonial powers
and the 20th century by the proxy conflicts of ideological powers, resource insuf-
ficiency in the 21st century is likely to lead to the proxy conflicts of corporate
powers. In this instance, as in the past examples, it is the interests of local com-
munities in living toward a sustainable future that are most at risk. All three
types of conflicts were (or could be) planned and executed in abstraction from the
consequences on the ground—seeing what goes on, in effect, from 30,000 feet
instead of it being up close and personal.
One could say that the first casualty of such conflicts is always democracy,
rather than truth. Yet it is an ironic fact that despite the overwhelming power of
the protagonists in each of the three scenarios, the conflict is enabled and pro-
longed only by the consent of the people. When the colonists objected, colonial
empires disappeared; when the people grew weary of the ideologies that entailed
perpetual conflict, they were rejected for new beliefs; when corporations focus
more on their own interests than on those of the people who buy their products or
services, the consumer makes other choices.
In a climate changing world, the risks of conflicts at any level, for any reasons
that might have been persuasive in the past, are simply too great for the perpetu-
ation of these conflicts to gain the long-term support of any population. With so
many elements in a precarious balance around the world, any large-scale conflict
could tip the balance and ensure global catastrophe. (For example, the more com-
puter modeling was done of the concept of “nuclear winter,” the less conflict it
was realized would be required to initiate one.)
There will always be segments of society intent on fighting for their own self-
ish reasons and their own specific concerns, but if the voice of the majority is
able to speak and be heard, perhaps for the first time in history it is possible for
democracy to take on a new form and purpose that leads to global peace and se-
curity in the 21st century.
A FOCUS FORWARD
With the forgoing as prologue, I would like to suggest ways of characterizing
aspects of democracy in the 21st century. In making the case for a discontinuity
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between the Enlightenment/Westphalian heritage and the future, these three terms
are offered as functional categories that allow for an assessment of democratic
forms and institutions—in widely different circumstances—both as they are now
and as they could become: subsistence; operational; and systemic. Each describes
how and why the population acquiesces to forms and institutions of governance
and under what conditions.
Subsistence democracy is currently the most common form of popular tol-
erance of whatever government might be in power. Whether local, regional
or national; whether representational democracy, authoritarian state or warlord;
whether Northern, Southern or somewhere in between; subsistence democracy is
also the most tenuous state of popular tolerance of governance and thus the most
easily disrupted.
As the word suggests, people tolerate the government that provides them with
the bare necessities of life. Especially in an agrarian context, this entails not only
allowing the small holder farmers to grow the crops they need to feed themselves,
but the security required for them to harvest what is planted. Western liberal
democracies where such security is taken for granted can lose sight of the im-
portance of this dimension of community life. In part, subsistence democracy is
about food and water; but in larger measure, popular tolerance of any government
is related to the likelihood of a secure harvest and the chance to plant the next.
Thus, as long as the demands placed on the community for tangible support
in the form of food, money and fodder for the military do not undermine its sub-
sistence, people will acquiesce in and tolerate virtually any form of governance.
Democratic ideals are well and good, but if there is no food and no prospect of
a harvest, people are forced to leave their communities for somewhere else. The
promise of local security is what promotes tolerance of whatever government
there happens to be—but should that government fail to provide such secu-
rity, tolerance of its leadership will instantly evaporate. Resentment can quickly
morph into opposition, as people lose their fear of whatever other alternative form
of governance might be possible. (“However bad Y might seem, it can’t be any
worse than X actually is.”)
Thus, when we consider the apparent regional successes of organizations
like Boko Haram or ISIL, it is not because the local populations have become
ideologically aligned with either group. If they, unlike the previous regional gov-
ernments, can provide what the people need for subsistence—and if opposition
to them threatens such subsistence, because of the lack of outside security sup-
port—people will acquiesce in whatever forms and institutions of governance
these groups require.
Such acquiescence, of course, is tenuous. Should the demands placed on the
people become too much, should these groups fail to maintain the security they
have promised, the people will just as readily accept whatever other form of gov-
ernance is offered that fulfills their needs for subsistence.
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In none of these examples is “support” an accurate term to describe the rela-
tionship between governors and governed. The tolerance of the people is relative
to whatever base line of services and security the community has determined, by
consensus, is sufficient for their subsistence. However minimal or marginal this
base line might be, the alternatives for governance are either believed less likely
to provide it or, out of ignorance, are simply feared to be worse.
Yet while it is relatively easy to identify subsistence democracy in developing
countries, the concept is equally applicable to attitudes in representational democ-
racies, Western and otherwise. The popular consensus may well be that the
government is inefficient, corrupt, and anything but representative of the will of
the people, but as long as the minimums of subsistence are met in local areas—or
local areas are left alone to manage their own subsistence—these defects (and the
government) are tolerated.
As societies become more developed, however, what constitutes subsistence
also develops from food, water, shelter and security to harvest the crop to some-
thing more. Infrastructure becomes part of the equation, as does transportation,
banking activities, employment, electricity, education, health care and some form
of social assistance for those who, because of short-term circumstance, are unable
to provide for themselves. Investment, both to make money in shorter term and
toward some future retirement, becomes the equivalent touchstone to the small-
holder farmer’s need for harvest security in determining whether or not the
current governors should be tolerated. Depending on the region, security from
military threats is also part of what is required, and (at times) security threats may
be used to fend off criticisms of governments failing to supply some of the other
base line necessities.
Yet here again, the population does not necessarily support the government;
it may be tolerated, or the people may acquiesce in what the government requires,
but only because these base line necessities for subsistence are seen to be pro-
vided. Threaten or remove these necessities, and popular tolerance wears thin;
demand too much from the population to enable the government, and people start
to consider whether other alternative forms or institutions of governance might
be more attractive. Fear of change can be overcome by fear of not having what,
by consensus, the population has decided is necessary for survival.
The demise of the nation state and the failure of representational democracy
have a direct impact on the prevalence of subsistence democracy today. If the na-
tion state can no longer guarantee subsistence, however that is defined, and if the
efforts of the people to elect representatives to form a government which (at a
minimum) will provide such subsistence are frustrated by corruption or any other
perceived problem with the electoral process, then the people’s tolerance of the
forms and institutions of such governance is tenuous and liable to shift if a viable
alternative for subsistence is presented.
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In all examples, subsistence democracy is thus distinct from any of the forms
or institutions of liberal democracy. It may be correlated with them, but there is
no causal relationship. If democracy is related to the will of the people, that will
may be expressed in terms of tolerance of or acquiescence to governance of what-
ever kind provides or maintains the level of services and conditions the people
consider necessary for subsistence. There is some limited dimension of coercion,
but not of society as a whole—or the people would cease to tolerate the govern-
ment, leading to a downward spiral into chaos, as more repression is met with
further resistance.
This is why various initiatives to eliminate severe poverty, provide clean wa-
ter and sanitation, and especially food security in developing countries, such as
those reflected in the proposed post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals, are
crucial to a sustainable future. In the absence of any of these dimensions of sub-
sistence, whatever other governing structures are in place (“democratic” or not),
the will of the people will be in opposition to those who are in government.
Once there is a minimum level of subsistence, however that is achieved, the
forms and institutions of governance again do not necessarily have to reflect those
of Western liberal democracy for a particular region to function as a democracy.
If the government, of whatever kind, is able to read the will or desire of the peo-
ple and do what the majority wants beyond bare subsistence, there is a second,
functional level of democracy that may be termed “operational.”
This level of democracy moves beyond tolerance or acquiescence to active
support. Yet that support, again, might only be correlated to the forms and in-
stitutions of representational democracy. As long as the government’s decisions
reflect the consensus of the majority, the people themselves handle dissent,
through peer pressure and even vigilante-ism. In this instance, repression of dis-
sent by government agents might be accepted by the general population, because
the dissenters are seen to be going against the will of the community; the govern-
ment thus becomes an agent of the people, dealing with those who object to what
the people want.
How this “will of the people” is determined is an open question—and cer-
tainly it can be created or manipulated by means of propaganda that is generated
through the various avenues that society provides, whether religious, racial, eth-
nic or ideological. Operational democracy therefore explains how populations
can be mobilized to support actions of a government that is anything but democ-
ratic in terms of the forms and institutions of representative liberal democracy. If
democracy is an expression of the will of the people, then at an operational level,
we must accept that the will of the people can be something other than the ideals
expressed in a liberal democratic tradition and yet still be “democratic.”
With the demise of the nation state and the ensuing globalization of culture, it
is possible to develop a global “will of the people,” outside political, geographic
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or cultural boundaries, which would lead to a worldwide operational democracy.
That consensus would have to be broadly construed, so that people of every level
of society could understand and agree with it, but communications technology
could be used to achieve such a goal, if it were sufficiently important to transcend
the other inevitable barriers that distance and difference create. The governments
of individual regions or nation states might try to block or prevent such a con-
sensus from developing, but such efforts would ultimately be futile were there a
global initiative of sufficient importance to everyone.
Thus, people around the world could be brought to understand and accept the
Enlightenment ideals of liberal democracy, but only if they are able to be ex-
pressed or conveyed in ways that do not also require acceptance of the forms and
institutions of representational democracy, burdened by a colonial past and an in-
effectual present. An operational democracy is not achieved, however, by means
of some perpetual referenda on the daily decisions of government. Even in the
electronic age and in well-wired cities, this would neither be timely nor practical.
Yet any government that correctly gauges the will of the majority and makes its
major decisions dependent on what it learns of that will—and not according to its
historical or ideological agenda—will be functioning as a democracy as a result,
regardless of the optics involved.
If “the end of democracy” is enabling the people as a whole to direct the major
decisions that affect their lives, then the concept of operational democracy leads
to the ironic possibility that a supposedly representational democracy might be
governed in ways that are actually further from incorporating “the will of the peo-
ple” into such decisions than one that, to outside eyes, resembles a dictatorship
or oligarchy. Certainly, this was a large part of the rationale behind the Occupy
Movement; such criticisms need to be taken seriously, because the assumption
that current representational democracy is actually an operational democracy
does not survive contact with the evidence—which is why voter turnout is dismal
and public opinion of politicians and governments ranges from overt hostility to
general dismay.
For both these concepts of subsistence democracy and operational
democracy, however, the third reality—the radical impacts of resource
insufficiency and climate change—has not yet been woven here into the 21st
century picture. These issues separately and in combination will drive changes in
governance that will create the discontinuity between post-Enlightenment ideals
of liberal democracy and institutions and what will mark life around the world in
the 21st century.
Subsistence democracy is effectively expressed at local levels—the ability
of local governance to manage the basic needs of the community. Operational
democracy will be the combination of communities, working toward an end to
which the communities together have decided. Any higher level of government
will thus effectively lead a community of communities—and, to remain func-
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tional, will need to do what the consensus of those communities directs, however
that consensus is formulated or communicated.
In a climate-changing world, plagued by resource insufficiency, moreover,
such decisions and the communities that make them will not be divided along
post-Westphalian lines on a map. Ecological topography, not political geogra-
phy, will be become a determining factor, because managing resources (like
water) only makes sense within the context of a specific watershed. To survive,
communities within particular watersheds will need to resolve their other dif-
ferences, or even subsistence will become impossible. Moreover, people within
such a watershed will tolerate whatever systems of governance make subsistence
possible, regardless of their form or institutional character.
In a crisis, people tend to support whatever works; perhaps the reason the
current forms and institutions of liberal representative democracy are continued
despite their flaws is that there has been no crisis sufficient to make otherwise
tolerant (or fearful) people search for or accept some alternative. If the scenarios
of potential climate-linked disasters take place as predicted, this situation may
change dramatically. Once local communities, united by suffering, have to sur-
vive on their own and fend for themselves, the likelihood of some outside agency
then subsequently imposing its will on these communities becomes vanishingly
small—especially if the devastation and suffering can be linked to decisions made
or avoided by governments from an earlier time.
The data about climate change and resource insufficiency is clear, even if
specific predictions about outcomes are not. When the inevitable crises happen,
governments that are only tolerated will quickly lose the acquiescence of com-
munities that fall below the level of subsistence in crucial areas and are blamed
either for failing to prevent the problem or for failing to plan for the contingency.
Whatever community government emerges from the crisis, assuming the com-
munity survives, will reflect operational democracy regardless of the forms or
institutions in which it is embodied.
DEMOCRACY FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE
The third aspect of 21st century democracy is systemic democracy. As a way for-
ward, it embodies both the needs of subsistence and operational democracy and
adds a further dimension that current representational democracy pretends to em-
body, but which history and experience have demonstrated it actually does not.
Systemic democracy is an expression of the will of the people, moving upward
from individuals into communities, into regions, nations and potentially into global
society as a whole. It is driven by principles, not by forms or institutions, and fosters
the web of relationships that a global society would need for a sustainable future.
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What makes it possible is not the sentiment—the sentiment has long been
present in the philosophy of democracy—but the potential means of its real-
ization. Never before has truly global communication been possible between so
many people, in so little time. What needs to be communicated is not information
per se, but what was first communicated in fragments by sailors, travellers and
other voyagers from earlier times that first established links between far-flung
regions and peoples—the stories that bridge the inevitable gulf between cultures.
It is the story of democracy that has caught the imagination of people all
over the world, leading to movements like Arab Spring, not the example of
western democracy or of parliamentary government. This is why the cultural
critique of such movements being examples of Western influence utterly
misses the mark. There is no particular desire to adopt Western forms and
institutions of representative democracy—but there is a desire to have
individual voices heard and heeded in the decisions that the government makes
about their future. Engagement and participation are found in stories of all
kinds that survive from generation to generation. Across cultures, around
the world and back into the distant past of every region, stories relate how
individuals have come to understand their situation and make choices that
determine their future.
The best stories thus are moral stories, stories that include characters with
which everyone can identify, stories into which people can write themselves as
characters. Moral stories embody principles, but they contextualize those prin-
ciples in ways people can understand. They render intellectual concepts into
community practice, explaining the “why” as well as the “what”—and demon-
strating the “how.”
In a systemic democracy, the relationships between government and people
are reciprocal and dynamic, not hierarchical or static. Leaders emerge from the
people because they represent the stories of the people, not because they run
clever campaigns or persuade people to choose against their instincts.
In the same way that climate change and resource insufficiency in a
globalized economy will break down the old political barriers, global stories
will break down efforts to marginalize or isolate social and cultural groups in
the interests of domination and control. Such stories, communicated between
individuals and communities, have the potential to unite based on common
experience rather than to divide based on old hostilities or disparities. Stories
personalize a shared experience of being human in ways that cross all the
boundaries of a post-colonial world, divided into North and South, West and
East, and all stops in between.
Additionally, these stories do not establish a human world separate from
the Earth. They are always relational, reflecting a pragmatic understanding
of the interrelationships between people and animals, between people and the
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natural world, and (usually) between people and some idea of the divine or
Other—a force or power larger than and outside the human sphere.
As we live into a climate-changing future, the perils of believing we are
somehow independent of or unaffected by the natural systems within which
our lives are interwoven will become ever more painfully apparent. The post-
Westphalian, Enlightenment philosophical and political system not only gave
the world representative liberal democracy and its institutions—it also gave it
the industrial, consumer culture that has contributed substantially to the plane-
tary problems our generation and the next must address.
The Earth story, as many have depicted it, needs to be understood and retold
to enable the global, collective response that is necessary to create a sustain-
able future for all the children of Earth—and not just the human ones. Systemic
democracy, in effect, is the political expression of such a story, bringing all voices
together to sing in a global chorus.
At this point, the argument that systemic democracy is “the end of democ-
racy” in the 21st century might seem to be fading into the realm of fan-
tasy—another place where stories, rather than facts, are important. After all,
the political, social, cultural and ecological problems faced by our generation
are concrete, not fantastical, and need equally concrete responses.
Interestingly, there is solid evidence of the appeal and increasing global im-
portance of systemic democracy, though it is understood by another name. The
desire for systemic democracy is increasingly manifested throughout the United
Nations system, and in other domestic and international fora, in terms of the de-
sire for “civil society engagement.”
Whether it is in terms of the post-2015 agenda and the Sustainable De-
velopment goals; the annual meetings of the Conference of the Parties for the
Framework Convention on Climate Change; the expanded global responsibil-
ities of the United Nations Environment Programme; the High Level Political
Forum in Sustainable Development; and so on, civil society engagement is
high on the agenda. While what it means, how it should take place, or where
it fits into an inter-governmental process are all still hotly debated, there is di-
minishing opposition to the idea that it is necessary for any of these global,
intergovernmental processes to implement the programs and achieve the goals
that are negotiated.
“Civil society engagement” is systemic democracy by another name. Civil
society engagement means having the perspective of society beyond the gov-
ernment heard and considered—a sharing of collective wisdom that enables
decisions to be made that are more likely to be seen to reflect the will of the
people than the choices of a few would ever be. It does not make civil society
spokespeople, however they are selected, into equals of the government repre-
sentatives in these processes—but governments that ignore the wisdom of their
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people risk making decisions that will not be supported by them, with potentially
disastrous results for us all.*
This takes us back to the opening premise that no government, however tyran-
nical, survives for long except by the consent of the people. Arguments for and
against democracy that focus on the forms and institutions of Western liberal rep-
resentative democracy miss this point. Any government that does not discern the
will of the people—and heed the will of the people in the decisions it makes—is
living on borrowed time, regardless of the structures of governance it maintains.
It is not enough to have the acquiescence of the people, either by fear of some
alternative or by holding them hostage to the necessities of subsistence. Nor is
it possible to dodge the truth of this premise by using some promise of other
worldly reward through the manipulations of religion or ideology to encourage
people to act against their better instincts and communal judgment. Manipulating
religious belief systems for political advantage, like armed troops on every street
corner, only suppresses the inevitable and in the end makes the rejection of such
coercive measures that much more violent.
To return again to the reality of resource insufficiency and climate change,
we are on the precipice of serious challenges to the stability of global society.
Some geographical areas might be in more imminent danger than others, but the
uncertainty of where and how (but not whether) these challenges will appear
unfortunately makes specific preparations difficult. The largest challenge in the
aftermath of any natural disaster—local, regional and global—will be to the
resilience of the people and their systems of governance. Acquiescence and
tolerance will not be enough; active support and engagement of the local commu-
nities, separately and jointly, will be crucial for survival.
“Resource insufficiency,” however, speaks to other system problems than
those caused by natural disaster. Managing this problem is at the core of the
post-2015 sustainable development agenda and the goals still being negotiated.
Sustainable development, however defined, must involve the guarantee of sub-
* As a Regional Major Groups and Stakeholders Representative for North America to
UNEP, I have been privileged to be involved in discussions around a new civil
society policy and engagement mechanism for the United Nations Environment
Programme over the past two years. I have witnessed and participated in the
negotiations at the 27th Governing Council meeting (2013) and at the first United
Nations Environment Assembly (2014), and consulted with colleagues involved in
the other UN processes. Progress is being made on all fronts toward substantive
engagement with civil society, while leaving the final decision-making in the hands
of the nation states involved. This is particularly important at a local level, where
civil society organizations are overwhelmingly responsible for the implementation
of government or UN sponsored programs relating to ecology and sustainable
development.
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sistence for people in all areas of the world and the promise of a future better
than the present circumstances in which they struggle. The dilemma, of course, is
that on a finite planet whose resources are being stretched, if not over-consumed,
such essential development in some areas requires a rethinking and reworking of
lifestyle in others.
At the heart of global, systemic democracy is the belief that all human life is
of equal value; the goal might be to ensure an equal voice for all in the decisions
that are made, but such a voice begins with the recognition of human equality
beyond any distinctions of gender, race, ethnicity, religion or ideology. Problems
multiply the moment the idea of systemic democracy is shouldered aside by the
assumption that some group—any group—is of more value than another.
In our current situation, it might seem impossible to achieve the sustainable
development goals, but we have not begun to harness the energy, wealth and
ingenuity of a global population in such an effort. Without that effort, and the
wisdom of all the people combined to generate the changes that are necessary, the
future is grim beyond description.
Thus, the telos or end of democracy is to create a sustainable future, not just
for a few or any category of elite, but for all people. The post-Westphalian, En-
lightenment thinkers invented, debated and created a society that they thought
would never again lead them back into the morass of internecine European war-
fare. On their own terms, they were successful, but the principles underpinning
that society led to imperialism, colonialism, and industrial consumerism—and
embedded racism, inequality and injustice in its structures.
Revolution was also at its core. Leaders of all kinds were forcibly reminded
to consider the will of the people, lest in dismissing them to eat cake, they, too,
lost their heads. Yet even throughout this history, it was the story of democ-
racy—liberal democracy—that drove the changes and development of European
society, not its forms and institutions. It was not until that period after World War
II that universal suffrage became the norm, and arguably some time after that be-
fore Western societies could even gingerly accept the label of being “liberal” in
their attitudes and policies. The story persuaded and inspired, even as the evi-
dence discounted its current acceptance, effectiveness or value.
In the same way, the story of a sustainable future, in which people are equal
in value and opportunity as well as equal in voice, is easily disputed. It would
take little to create a litany of objections, reasons why such a sustainable future
is impractical or impossible, supported by an arsenal of evidence. Yet as a means
of mobilizing a global community, threatened by common problems and united
through global communications technology, such a story is one within which we
all may find characters we recognize and a role that we can play.
“Liberté, Equalité, Fraternité” made a powerful statement and was a wonder-
ful battle cry to unite people in a common cause—even if the resulting forms
and institutions were far from making such sentiments concrete in the lives of
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the people of France. The Declaration of Independence had equally high-minded
principles that, after more than two centuries, are still not enacted in the lives of
many Americans. For both, the revolution was born and transmitted through story
in ways that caught the imagination and gained the allegiance of large groups of
people who could not have been mobilized together in any other way.
If “the end of democracy” in the 21st century is to enable people to choose
their own future, from local communities to a globalized society, it needs a story
to lead the way. That story must be an Earth story, one that can communicate
what is possible when the voice of the people, everywhere, is heard and heeded
by those who make decisions on their behalf. That story must hold all leaders to
account, just as it impels individuals to make choices that shape their daily lives
in a sustainable direction.
Creating that story requires thinking through the philosophy of democracy in
our time, finding the language to guide the thoughts of a global population, just
as it requires others to generate the passion to guide our hearts, toward a future
that is sustainable for all of the children of Earth.
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